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1. Introduction 
Investigating the pass-through of monetary policy impulses onto retail banking 
interest rates has become an important part of the research on the financial part of the 
monetary transmission process in the Eurozone as its results have direct implications for 
assessing the efficiency of the monetary policy, the heterogeneity (or a possible trend 
towards homogeneity) of the Eurozone financial system, and the competitive situation in 
different segments of the banking markets. While this research area is fairly well 
developed by now, the complete absence of interest rate expectations and monetary 
policy anticipation from the literature is striking. In the presence of forward looking 
financial markets, and in particular the existence of interest rate futures, such as 
EURIBOR futures, which may act as a measure of expected future interest rates, pricing 
behaviour in retail banking is likely to be forward looking too. The present study will 
explore this issue by disentangling the impact of expected and unexpected monetary 
policy impulses and discuss the impact of a well-communicated monetary policy on the 
Eurozone interest rate pass-through. 
Following the pioneering pass-through study by Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) 
who are applying a VAR model in an international context, this approach had soon been 
adopted within the European context (Cottarelli, Ferri, and Generale 1995, BIS 1994, 
Borio and Fritz 1995). Following Sander and Kleimeier (2000) pass-through studies are 
now regularly based on an error-correction specification (e.g. Mojon 2000, Heinemann 
and Schüler 2001, Toolsema, Sturm and de Haan 2002). Most recently, asymmetric 
adjustment of retail bank rates to monetary impulses has also been considered. This until 
now relatively small literature (see e.g. Sander and Kleimeier 2000, 2002, de Bondt 2002, 
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and de Bondt, Mojon, and Valla 2002) builds on Tong (1983), Scholnick (1996, 1999), 
Balke and Fomby (1997), Enders and Granger (1998), Baum and Karasulu (1998), and 
Enders and Siklos (2000). Eurozone pass-through studies commonly find the following 
pattern: First, bank interest rates are sticky. Monetary policy rate changes typically lead 
to a less than one-to-one change of retail rates, i.e. the short and medium-run multipliers 
are taking values often far below unity. Second, there are considerable differences in the 
pass-through across different bank lending and deposit rates. Third, studies that allow for 
asymmetric adjustment depending on the type of monetary policy shock typically find 
ample evidence for asymmetries, but these asymmetries show no consistent pattern. 
Fourth, while there is no consensus yet regarding a possible full pass-through in the long 
run, most authors agree that the pass-through is most complete with respect to short-term 
lending to enterprises. Fifth, most studies find significant differences in the pass-through 
mechanism across the Eurozone countries. Finally, there is increasing, though still weak 
evidence that the pass-through mechanism has become faster and more homogeneous in 
the recent years, potentially pointing to the role of the Euro and the single Eurozone 
monetary policy. Nevertheless, the remaining differences in existing literature are still 
high. In Sander and Kleimeier (2003) we have tried to unify this research by arguing as 
follows: First, these differences are caused by predominantly by differences in (1) the 
choice of exogenous market interest rate, (2) the length and timing of the investigated 
periods, (3) the treatment of possible structural breaks, and (4) the chosen methodology 
for the pass-through study. Second, these differences could be reconciled by focussing on 
a unifying approach that uses an appropriate measure of the monetary policy stance such 
as short-run money market rates, incorporates endogenous determination of structural 
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breaks, and introduces an automatic model selection out of a vast variety of possible 
pass-through models allowing for asymmetric and threshold adjustment. Doing so, we 
find that breakpoints are typically occurring some years before monetary union has 
commenced, thus pointing to the important role of forward looking behaviour in financial 
markets. Comparing then pre- and post-break pass-through behaviour, we confirm the 
results of previous studies that report stickiness of short-run adjustment of retail interest 
rates in the Eurozone. Nevertheless an increased speed of the pass-through in the post-
break period is confirmed. Moreover, we find a large number of banking markets with a 
less than perfect long-run pass-through. This suggests that market imperfections such as 
credit rationing may have remained an important feature in European retail banking. The 
view that Eurozone banking markets are still fragmented is supported, with the eventual 
exemption of short-term lending to enterprises. Finally, analysing the determinants of the 
pass-through we find that competition, banking market integration, a stable monetary 
policy regime, or a more homogeneous growth performance are all important variables 
for homogenizing the pass-through and thus monetary transmission in the Eurozone 
while legal and cultural differences may, however, preclude full convergence. 
In this paper we extend this unifying approach to the pass-through of monetary 
policy impulses onto retail banking by introducing a distinction between expected and 
unexpected monetary policy changes. As financial markets are forward looking, it can be 
argued that changes in policy rate may already be priced into retail banking interest rates 
well before the actual changes in the monetary policy occur. For example, in the context 
of the US mortgage market Sellon (2002) has argued that in the recent years “both 
mortgage rate and market interest rate appear to anticipate monetary policy actions”, i.e. 
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they rose somewhat before episodes of monetary tightening and fell well before decreases 
in federal funds target rates. Consequently, if retail interest rates anticipate changes in 
monetary policy rates, the measured short- and medium-term multipliers may not convey 
a correct picture of the pass-through process. A related issue is the impact of correct 
anticipation of the ECB’s policy actions on the speed of the pass-through process, thus 
pointing to the role of a frictionless communication between the central bank and the 
market. Moreover, the irregular pattern of asymmetries across countries and banking 
products found in previous studies may reflect a differential behaviour with respect to 
expected and unexpected shocks. By differentiating between both we want to shed some 
more light on the stickiness of bank product prices. Finally, it could be argued that with a 
single monetary policy the anticipation of monetary policy action will also become more 
uniform across the Eurozone and thus contribute to a more homogenous pass-through. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we introduce our measurement of 
expected and unexpected monetary policy shocks by making use of EURIBOR futures to 
measure expected interest rates – which is novel in the pass-through literature. In section 
3 we briefly describe our methodology. Section 4 reports the results of our analysis and 
section 5 concludes with a view on improving the pass-through process in the Eurozone. 
 
2. Data 
In order to differentiate between expected and unexpected shocks we follow 
Kuttner (2001) who – in the US context – has made use of the federal funds future market 
as an indicator for anticipated monetary policy rate. Unfortunately, in the Eurozone no 
futures on ECB policy rates are available. However, Bernoth and von Hagen (2003) 
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analyse 3-months EURIBOR futures and conclude that these rates are unbiased and 
efficient predictors of future spot interest rates. These authors also assert that “market 
participants understand the policy decisions of the Central Bank and on average are able 
to predict them precisely. Nevertheless some Governing Council decisions still cause 
leading market participants to revise their interest rate forecasts. Thus the ECB’s 
information policy can be improved.” Consequently, we differentiate between expected 
and unexpected monetary policy impulses such that  
                                                         MP = MPU + MPE (1) 
where MP is the realized monetary policy rate, MPE is the expected and MPU the 
unexpected monetary policy rate. As a proxy for the monetary policy rate (MP) the 
European Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR) for 1-month euro time deposits is chosen. 
This choice is motivated by the fact that futures exist on this underlying asset which can 
be used to estimate MPE and MPU.1  In contrast to Bernoth and von Hagen (2003) who 
use a 3-months future that only matures four times a year, the 1-month future has the 
advantage that at any given point in time, futures maturing in the next six calendar 
months are being traded. Thus, we are able to create a monthly MPE series, which 
matches the monthly frequency of the bank interest rates. Furthermore, the short-term 
nature of the underlying asset, the 1-month euro deposit, better reflects the central bank’s 
monetary policy rate than any longer-term interest rate. 
Based on the daily data for each future contract provided by Eurex, MP is 
measured by the final settlement price of the future2. Given the standardized maturity of 
                                                 
1 In particular, we opted for the FEU1 futures contract traded on Eurex in Frankfurt as a proxy for monetary 
policy expectations. 
2 The final settlement price of a future is established by Eurex at 11:00 a.m. CET on the last trading day 
(LTD) and is based on the EURIBOR rate for one-month euro time deposits as established by the 
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the future two trading days before the third Wednesday of each month, the future’s final 
settlement price reflects the monetary policy rate approximately in the middle of the 
calendar month. The expected monetary policy rate MPE is defined based on the daily 
settlement price of the future.3 As these daily settlement prices are available up to six 
months before the last trading day (LTD) of each future, a choice has to be made which 
of these daily settlement prices serves as a proxy of MPE. The LTD of the future falls 
typically between the 13th and the 19th of the month. As such, a daily settlement price 12 
to 16 trading days before maturity covers for all futures the beginning of the calendar 
month. Thus, MPE is defined as the equally weighted average of the daily settlement 
prices from 12 to 16 trading days before the LTD of the future and as such approximates 
the expected monetary policy rate at the beginning of the calendar month4.  
The unexpected component of the monetary policy MPU can now simply be 
calculated as MP minus MPE. Figure 1 shows the time series graphs of all three series. 
As the comparison between MPE and MP shows, futures rates follow very closely the 
realised monetary policy rates. As such MPU, the unexpected component of the monetary 
policy impulses, centres around zero. Unit root tests confirm this random nature of MPU 
as it is found to be I(0). On the other hand, both MP and MPE are I(1). As such, 
regressing MP on MPE (see Panel A of Table A2 in the Appendix) can be interpreted in 
two ways. First, it represents the standard test of the unbiasedness of futures where 
                                                                                                                                                 
FBE/ACI. In particular, the final settlement price is calculated as 100 minus the EURIBOR, which has been 
rounded to the nearest price interval (0.005; 0.01; or a multiple thereof), The LTD is two exchange trading 
days prior to the third Wednesday of the respective settlement month with trading ending at 11 a.m. 
3 Eurex’s trading hours are 8.45 a.m. until 7.00 p.m. CET. Eurex defines the daily settlement price as “the 
volume-weighted average price of the last five trades of the day, provided they are not older than 15 
minutes - or, if more than five trades have occurred during the final minute of trading, then the volume-
weighted average price of all trades that occurred during that period”. 
4 We also tried alternative specifications of MPE such as averages over different trading days or one-day 
settlement prices, but the basic tenor of the results remains unchanged. 
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futures are found to be unbiased if θ0=0 and θ=15. In line with Bernoth and von Hagen’s 
(2003) results for 3-months EURIBOR futures, we can also confirm unbiasedness for the 
1-month EURIBOR futures market. Second, the regression can be interpreted as a 
cointegration relationship between the two series. The Durbin-Watson (DW) and Dickey-
Fuller (DF) tests clearly support the existence of such a cointegration relationship. 
Expected monetary policy rates MPE can therefore be visualized as temporarily deviating 
from monetary policy rates (and thus leading to non-zero realizations of MPU) but 
reverting back to monetary policy rate MP in the long run.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Given the data limitation for EURIBOR futures and acknowledging that our 
previous analyses indicated structural breaks mostly before the introduction of the Euro 
we concentrate in the following on the EMU period starting January 1, 1999. Our study is 
based on monthly national retail interest rates for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain6 that have been obtained from 
the ECB. The ECB provides six different loan rates: Three consumer lending rates for 
overdrafts on cash accounts (N1), mortgage loans to households (N2), and consumer 
loans to households (N3); two corporate lending rates for short-term loans to enterprises 
(N4), and medium and long-term loans to enterprises (N5); and a final category for other 
lending rates (N6). In addition, the ECB collects three different deposit rates for current 
                                                 
5 For a discussion and application of this approach see Cole, Impson and Reichenstein (1991), Krehbiel and 
Adkins (1994), Cole and Reichenstein (1994), Krueger and Kuttner (1996), and Bernoth and van Hagen 
(2003). 
6 Greece has been excluded because it did not join EMU until January 2001. 
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account deposits (N7), time deposits (N8), and savings accounts (N9); and a final 
category for other deposit rates (N10). We collect these data on a monthly basis from 
January 1999 to May 2003.7 
 
3. Methodology 
In this study, we follow a methodology developed by Sander and Kleimeier 
(2002). As a starting point we employ the “standard pass-through model” which is a 
simple VAR model used by Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), 
                                tit
*n
1i
iM,t1it
*k
1i
iBR,0t εMPβMPβBRββBR ++++= −
=
−
=
∑∑  (2) 
where BRt and MPt are bank and policy rates. The optimal lag length is indicated by k* 
and n*, respectively. The impact multiplier is estimated by the coefficient β1, where a 
value of less than 1 indicates sluggish adjustment, also known as lending rate stickiness. 
The long-term multiplier can be calculated from (2) as  
                                                           
∑
∑
=
=
−
+
= *k
1i iBR,
*n
1i
iMP,1
β1
ββ
θ  (3) 
so that in the long run equation (2) takes the form 
                                                         t0t θMPθBR +=  (4) 
A full pass-through in the long run is reflected by θ=1. 
The novelty that is introduced in this study is the differentiation between expected 
and unexpected monetary policy rate components, i.e. MP is replaced by MPE and MPU, 
                                                 
7 For details on data, see the ECB’s National Retail Interest Rates – Methodological Notes. Only bank 
lending and deposit rates available in monthly frequency are included. Thus, quarterly series available for 
France are not included in the sample. 
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as defined in equation (1). While the long-run relationship remains unchanged, the VAR 
model now takes the following specification8.  
                          ttUtEit
*k
1i
iBR,0t εMPUβMPEβBRββBR ++++= −
=
∑  (5) 
Note that as futures are unbiased forecasts of monetary policy rates, any unexpected 
monetary impulses can be interpreted as temporary and should as such be accounted for 
in the next months’ futures rate. This impression is supported by the finding discussed 
above that MP and MPE are cointegrated and that MPU is I(0). As such, introducing lags 
of MPE or MPU would not be appropriate and would only lead to multicollinearity 
problems. 
 The model of equation (5) is considered as our standard model in levels 
(STD_LL) but is only valid if interest rates time series are not integrated. If, what is 
commonly the case, interest rates are integrated of degree 1, the model has to be 
estimated in first differences. As such, two model specifications have to be considered:  
                        ttUtEit
*k
1i
iBR,0t ε∆MPUβ∆MPEβ∆BRββ∆BR ++++= −
=
∑  (6) 
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∑  (7) 
Model (6) is our standard model (STD) and is appropriate when interest rates are I(1) but 
BR and MP are not cointegrated. When interest rates are found to be I(1) and 
cointegrated, simply estimating model (6) to avoid spurious regression problems causes a 
loss of important information about the long-run relationship. This information can be 
obtained from the cointegration regression 
                                                 
8 In this as in all other models, the optimal number of lags is selected via the AIC criterion and  a maximum 
of 4 lags is allowed. 
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                                                  BRt = θ0 + θ MPt + ut (8) 
and should be fed into the pass-through model, such as given by equation (7). In this 
model ECTt-1, the estimated error term ut-1 of the cointegration regression, is included 
with its coefficient βECT reflecting the speed of adjustment to the long-run cointegrating 
equilibrium. In all three models (5) to (7), βE and βU represent the impact multipliers with 
respect to expected and unexpected monetary policy shocks. The long-run multiplier can 
either be found as θ from the cointegration regression (8) or – when interest rates are not 
cointegrated – can be estimated based on the coefficients of equation (5) or (6) as 
                                                         
∑
=
−
+= *k
1i BR,i
UE
β1
ββθ  (9) 
We allow for six different types of cointegration relationships and test which of these  
type fits the data best. First, there can be a symmetric cointegration relationship between 
BR and MP as defined by Engle and Granger (1987) such that ECTt-1 = ut-1 from equation 
(8). Cointegration is based on the Durbin-Watson (DW), Dickey-Fuller (DF) and 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) testing procedures. This specification assumes that bank 
rates immediately adjust to any, however small deviation from the long-run equilibrium 
and that the adjustment is the same for negative as for positive deviations. As the other 
five models are using a modified version of the ADF test, the DF and ADF test for this 
symmetric model should be noted in comparison. The DF test is based on  
                                                         ∆ut =  -δ0 ut-1 + εt (10) 
and the ADF test is obtained from the regression  
                                                   tit
*c
1i
i1t0t ε∆uδuδ∆u ++−= −
=
− ∑  (11) 
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where the optimal lag length c* is found based on the minimum Akaike information 
criterion (AIC) criteria with a maximum of four lags. 
Second, there could be asymmetric adjustment of BR to MP in the sense that the 
adjustment of BR depends on its relation to the equilibrium level. For example, if MP 
increases without an immediate adjustment in the lending rate, we obtain a negative 
realization of the error term ut. When the autoregressive decay is faster for MP increases 
than for MP decreases, then the lending rate adjusts faster upward than downward. Such 
an asymmetric adjustment pattern can be modelled with a threshold autoregressive model 
(TAR0) as developed by Tong (1983), where the ECT is split into its positive and 
negative elements. In particular, a Heaviside indicator It is set for different states of ut-1. 
                                            

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≥=
−
−
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I
1t
1t
t  (12) 
For this model, we can test for cointegration by estimating  
                                           t
*m
1i
iti21t2t1t1tt ε∆uρu)ρI(1uρI∆u ++−+= ∑
=
−+−−  (13) 
with the optimal lag length m* determined via the minimum AIC criteria for models with 
up to four lags. As a modified ADF test, the estimated F-statistic for H0: ρ1 = ρ2 = 0 
serves as a cointegration test. Furthermore, an F-test for H0: ρ1 = ρ2 indicates the presence 
of asymmetry. For both tests, critical values are provided by Enders and Siklos (2000). 
 Third, we extend the model to allow for a non-zero threshold. For example, the 
BR will adjust fast only when it deviates from its long-term equilibrium relationship with 
MP by more than some optimal threshold a0* of, say, 20 basis points. For lower 
deviations, adjustment would eventually take place at a significantly slower pace. Such 
 12 
behaviour can be modelled with a TAR* model, for which the Heaviside indicator in 
conjunction with equation (13)9 is defined as 
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To determine the optimal threshold a0* we follow Chan (1993) and search over the mid-
80% of the distribution of ut and select the model for which the residual sum of squares is 
minimized. Cointegration and asymmetry testing proceeds with the above described F-
tests. 
 Forth, we consider adjustment processes consistent with either menu-cost or 
interest-smoothing behaviour. To illustrate the interest rate stickiness driven by menu-
cost, consider a situation where deviations from equilibrium are small such that they fall 
into a narrow band bordered by a0* and –a0*. Inside this band, no adjustment will take 
place and thus no cointegration can be detected. Only outside this band, for example 
below –a0*, the benefits from increasing lending rates outweigh the associated menu-cost 
and adjustment will take place. Interest rate smoothing is reflected by the opposite 
behaviour when adjustment takes place and thus cointegration is found inside the band 
but not outside. Here banks protect customers against excessive – but potentially 
temporary – deviations from equilibrium. Such behaviour can be modelled with a Band-
TAR* model10, based on a Heaviside indicator defined as  
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Equation (13) has then to be modified to 
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9 For both, the TAR* and the following B-TAR* model, the optimal lag length m* of the TAR0 
specification is used. 
10 For applications of this B-TAR* model to interest rate cointegration where infrequent and discrete 
adjustments in the rates occur see for example Balke and Fomby (1997) or Baum and Karasulu (1998). 
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Procedures for optimal lag length m* and optimal threshold a0* are corresponding to 
those of the TAR* and the F-tests for cointegration and asymmetry are applied to all 
three coefficients ρj. 
 As the fifth and sixth adjustment processes, we consider M-TAR0 and M-TAR* 
processes based on Enders and Granger (1998). Here, a different type of interest rate 
smoothing is modelled where the speed of the ECT is of importance11. The Heaviside 
indicator in conjunction with equation (13) is now defined as 
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A threshold can be set as a0 = 0 leading to the M-TAR0 specification or be optimised at a0 
= a0* > 0 leading to the M-TAR* specification.12 
To distinguish which of these six models best fits the data, we consider the 
following sequence of tests. We first test all interest rates for unit roots. If rates are found 
to be I(1), we secondly estimate the cointegration relationship and obtain the residuals ût. 
Third, we estimate all five TAR-type models and select the model with the smallest AIC 
value. For this optimal TAR model, we test for cointegration and asymmetry. If 
asymmetric cointegration is confirmed, we define the error-correction process (as 
measured by the ECT) based on this optimal TAR-type model. In case that asymmetric 
cointegration is not confirmed, we test for symmetric cointegration. Only after symmetric 
cointegration is rejected we estimate the standard pass-through model in levels or first 
differences depending on the results of the unit root tests. Finally after the optimum pass-
                                                 
11 M-TAR models have been successfully applied to the term structure of interest rates by for example 
Enders and Granger (1998) and Enders and Siklos (2000). 
12 When optimising the threshold in the M-TAR* model, the optimal lag length m* from the M-TAR0 is 
used. 
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through model is selected, multipliers are obtained for a variety of positive and negative 
interest rate shocks.13  
 
4. Results 
In order to select the optimal pass-through model, we start with the unit root 
testing and report the results in Table A1 of the appendix. As expected all bank rates have 
the I(1) or sometimes I(2) property and as such we can proceed with the cointegration 
testing of BR and MP. Table A2 reports results of both, the estimation of the long-run 
relationship of equation (7) and the symmetric cointegration tests. Overall, 40 out of 72 
series (55.6%) are symmetrically cointegrated. However, if the true nature of the 
cointegration relationship is asymmetric, these tests might be misspecified. We therefore 
conduct asymmetric cointegration tests that reveal which pass-through model would be 
best specified for the country and interest rate under consideration. Based on the results 
reported in Table A3 of the appendix, of all 72 long-run relationships between the bank 
rate and monetary policy rate, 14 pairs of series (19%) are symmetrically cointegrated, 41 
pairs of series (57%) are asymmetrically cointegrated, and 17 pairs of series (24%) show 
                                                 
13 As already noted in Sander and Kleimeier (2003), two peculiarities of the asymmetric models should be 
taken into account when estimating multipliers: First, multipliers cannot simply be obtained by comparing 
two sets of forecasts – with and without changes in the explanatory variable – at any point in time because 
the speed of adjustment in asymmetric pass-through models depends on the model’s estimated error. 
Therefore, such multipliers apply only to the particular context but cannot be generalized. In order to obtain 
state-independent multipliers, we calculate them based on an equilibrium situation. In particular, we force 
the change in the expected and unexpected monetary policy rates to zero at the end of each estimation 
period and allow the retail bank rate to converge to an equilibrium, before the impact of a shock in the 
expected or unexpected monetary policy rates is simulated. The multipliers are then calculated based on the 
resulting retail bank rate’s adjustment. Note that some asymmetric pass-through models may not converge 
to an equilibrium. In such cases, we would only obtain state dependent multipliers. To avoid this, we 
decided to select the next-best converging asymmetric model based on the AIC criterion or – in extreme 
problem cases – the symmetric or standard pass-through model. Details regarding the finally selected 
optimal or next-best models are given in Tables B3 and B4 of Appendix B. These tables also show that 
non-convergence is a rather rare problem. Second, multipliers are also varying with the specific type of the 
shock as the reaction of bank rates depends on the size and direction of the monetary policy shock. 
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no cointegration. Note also that in all cases of asymmetric adjustment, a non-zero 
threshold is chosen as a best fit for the data. These findings are in line with Sander and 
Kleimeier (2003) and highlight yet again the importance of asymmetric and threshold 
modelling in pass-through analyses.  
Focussing now on the characteristics of the pass-through process, our long-run 
results are largely in line with the pass-through literature as long-run multipliers are often 
below 1 with the notable exemption of short-term lending to enterprises. Turning to 
impact multipliers and the short-run dynamics – again in line with the literature – we find 
considerable stickiness in bank rates. To illustrate that, in a first step, two sets of 
multipliers are calculated: One for a +1% shock in MPE, the other for a +1% shock in 
MPU. The results are summarized in Figure 2. Details on a country and rate level are 
listed in Table A4 of the appendix. Figure 2 illustrates how bank rates on average react to 
both, expected as well as unexpected monetary policy shocks and clearly reveals the 
incomplete and sluggish pass-through. Furthermore, for all rates except time deposits, the 
reaction to expected monetary policy impulses appears to be larger than to unexpected 
impulses as MPE multipliers are larger than the MPU multipliers.14 
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
For practical purposes, it would also be interesting to find out how bank rates 
react to a simultaneous shock in both MPE and MPU. Simply shocking both rates by 
                                                 
14 It should however be pointed out here, that due to the structure of the pass-through model, i.e. the fact 
that it does not include any lags of MPE or MPU, a larger impact multiplier will be followed by larger 
interim multipliers as the only adjustment in the interim occurs due to the ECT and the lags of the bankrate. 
These coefficients are however the same for MPE as for MPU shocks. 
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+1%, however, is not feasible. Looking at the series as displayed in Figure 1, it is clear 
that the size and volatility of MPE and MPU are different with an average MPE of 3.61% 
and MPU of 0.015% and standard deviations of 0.785% and 0.1076%, respectively. Thus, 
whereas the analysis in Figure 2 and Table A4 are useful on a purely comparative basis, a 
+1% shock for MPU would be quite unrealistic. A more realistic comparison could be 
based on the relative volatilities of the two series. A +1% shock in the overall MP rate 
could consist of an 0.8795% shock in MPE (based on the relative standard deviation of 
MPE as 0.7850/(0.7850+0.1076)) and an 0.1205% shock in MPU (based on the relative 
standard deviation of MPU as 0.1076/(0.7850+0.1076)). The results of such an analysis 
are presented in Table 1. Note that the effect of the joint shock is in most cases simply the 
sum of the two individual shocks. Sometimes, however, when the data is characterized by 
asymmetries, the joint shock can lead to a larger or a smaller shock than the sum of the 
individual shocks. Examples of such cases are mortgage rates in Belgium and Portugal, 
short-term corporate loan rates in Belgium, France, and Ireland, or long-term corporate 
rates in Finland and Ireland. Given the fact that more than half of our series are 
characterized by asymmetric adjustment, one should not underestimate this effect. 
Finally, a comparison can be made between the joint shock to MPE and MPU as reported 
in Table 1 and a +1% shock to the realized monetary policy rate MP as reported in Table 
2. Here clearly recognizable differences in the size of the pass-through occur for most 
countries, rates, and time-horizons. Even if no clear direction can be identified, these 
results strongly support our case: Market expectations matter in the pass-through and 
disregarding them leads to an incorrect perception of the pass-through process. 
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[Insert Table 1 about here] 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
On a statistically more sophisticated base, our multipliers allow for testing of 
several interesting hypotheses. To do so, we constructed a panel consisting out of all 
positive and negative shock multipliers for both, expected and unexpected shocks, thus 
leading to a total of 260 observations. First, we test whether bank rates react significantly 
faster to expected than to unexpected shocks as suggested by Figure 2. We therefore 
regress a dummy for expected monetary policy shocks on the impact and interim 
multipliers. In a second step of this exercise we also control for country and bank rate 
specifics by using the appropriate dummies. While in a first attempt we did not find 
statistically significant evidence for a special anticipated monetary policy effect, this 
result changes when using separate dummies for deposits and loans, thus pointing to 
differential effects in both markets15. The first set of regressions in Table 3 shows that the 
pass-through of expected market rate changes is significantly faster, but only for loans 
and not for deposits. To explore this issue further we have also made the same estimates 
for separated panels for positive and negative multipliers, which are reported in Table 4. 
Anticipated rate increases, measured by a +1% shock, will statistically significant 
increase the pass-through in the loan markets up to 3 months. More specifically, banks 
will increase lending rates faster when they expect increases in market interest rates, but 
deposit rate will not be raised any faster. When looking into negative shocks some 
differences to the positive shock effects and – in this sense – some degree of asymmetry 
                                                 
15 We are grateful to Robert DeYoung for suggesting this regression framework. 
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can be found. I.e. the downward adjustment of lending rates for anticipated rate decreases 
is only significant for the impact and 1-month multipliers.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
In order to explore asymmetries further, we use the large panel to test directly for 
downward and upward symmetries in deposit and loan markets, regardless whether the 
shocks are anticipated or unanticipated. Without country and rate dummies, we clearly 
identify significantly slower upward adjustments of deposit rates, thus pointing to upward 
rigidities of deposit rate. Using all rate and country dummies the statistical significance of 
this result diminishes somewhat in the very short run, but nevertheless we can even here 
find slower deposit rate adjustment for the 3- to 12-months multipliers. Our results can 
thus be understood as evidence for price rigidity in the banking industry in the sense of 
Hannan and Berger (1991) who have demonstrated that US deposit rate show clear signs 
of upward rigidity. 
Finally, we use our pass-through results to test for the impact of interest-rate 
expectations on the homogeneity of the Eurozone pass-through. For doing so, we define 
convergence as the standardized variation of the respective impact and interim multipliers 
as |θj,s,t -θMean,s,t|/θMean,s,t .16 To test whether expected shocks lead to less divergence we 
regress the convergence variable on expected shock dummies, which are again separated 
for deposits and loans. The results, reported in Table 5, show that expected monetary 
                                                 
16 Note that the subscripts indicate country j (Austria to Spain), shock s (MPE versus MPU shock), and time 
horizon t (impact to 12 –months multipliers). Thus, each multiplier is compared to the cross-country 
average multiplier for its respective type of shock s and time horizon t.  
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shocks lead to a higher degree of homogeneity in the Eurozone pass-through in loan, but 
not in deposit markets. However, the homogenizing effect is less pronounced for negative 
shocks, again pointing to the important role different national financial market structures. 
The result therefore suggests that although a well-communicated monetary policy will be 
very helpful in creating a more uniform Eurozone pass-through, the importance of a 
competitive retail banking market must also be highlighted. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
In sum, the point can be made that a well-anticipated, well-communicated 
monetary policy goes some way to speed-up and homogenize the pass-through process 
and thus improve the effectiveness of monetary policy in the Eurozone. However, this 
would only constitute a complement to and not a substitute for competitive markets. 
 
5. Conclusions  
Our paper extends the traditional pass-through literature by introducing a 
distinction between expected and unexpected monetary policy impulses. Among the most 
important conclusion are, first, that this novel approach can be considered to be an 
important addition to the literature as a significant positive impact of interest rate 
anticipation on the pass-through can statistically be proven. Secondly, given the faster 
response of retail banking rates to anticipated monetary policy impulses, our results point 
to the important role of a good central bank policy communication policy for monetary 
policy effectiveness. Thirdly, we find severe asymmetries in retail banking price 
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behaviour, in particular a more sluggish behaviour of deposit rate, thus highlighting the 
importance of price rigidity in the banking industry. It should be noted that the earlier 
findings in the literature that asymmetries are present but do show irregular pattern are 
not confirmed here. In particular with respect to anticipated interest rate changes the 
asymmetries show quite clear pattern that point to role of imperfect competitive markets. 
Fourth, and consequently, while a transparent central bank policy is helpful for speeding 
up the pass-through, it is no substitute for competitive markets. Finally and  under similar 
reservations regarding competitive banking markets, our results point to the potential role 
of a good central bank communication policies in harmonizing the Eurozone pass-
through. 
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Appendix 
 
[Insert Tables A1 to A4 here] 
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Figure 1: Expected, unexpected and realized monetary policy rates
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Figure 2: The average pass-through of a +1% monetary policy shock
Note: The left bar represent average multipliers associated with a +1% shock to the expected monetary policy rate whereas the right bar represent average multipliers
associated with a +1% shock to the unexpected MP rate.
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Table 1: Multipliers for a separate or joint shocks of +0.8795% to expected monetary policy rates and +0.1205% to unexpected monetary policy rates  
multiplier
impact 1 month 3 months 6 months 12 months longrun
country bankrate model both MPE MPU both MPE MPU both MPE MPU both MPE MPU both MPE MPU
Austria 2 MTAR* 0.284 0.263 0.021 0.266 0.246 0.020 0.541 0.486 0.050 0.729 0.643 0.081 0.619 0.543 0.078 0.612
3 TAR* 0.359 0.315 0.044 0.382 0.336 0.046 0.556 0.489 0.070 0.668 0.587 0.084 0.661 0.581 0.080 0.611
4 SYM 0.343 0.314 0.029 0.486 0.437 0.048 0.714 0.636 0.078 0.749 0.659 0.090 0.605 0.531 0.074 0.625
7 TAR* 0.024 0.025 -0.001 0.020 0.020 0.000 0.020 0.021 -0.001 0.020 0.022 -0.002 0.018 0.023 -0.005 0.023
8 SYM 0.205 0.186 0.019 0.289 0.258 0.031 0.437 0.387 0.050 0.466 0.410 0.056 0.434 0.382 0.052 0.436
Belgium 2 BTAR* 0.245 0.224 0.022 0.237 0.216 0.021 0.768 0.694 0.035 1.091 0.985 0.043 1.349 1.275 0.051 0.723
3 STD 0.452 0.407 0.044 0.464 0.418 0.046 0.464 0.418 0.046 0.464 0.418 0.046 0.464 0.418 0.046 0.854
4.1 MTAR* 0.517 0.460 0.057 0.527 0.468 0.058 0.863 0.841 0.109 1.126 1.060 0.142 1.014 0.874 0.122 0.925
4.2 MTAR* 0.428 0.364 0.063 0.377 0.321 0.056 0.584 0.504 0.080 0.717 0.624 0.092 0.827 0.726 0.101 0.853
5 MTAR* 0.254 0.213 0.041 0.316 0.265 0.051 0.447 0.382 0.065 0.475 0.415 0.060 0.305 0.272 0.033 0.344
8 SYM 0.290 0.227 0.063 0.303 0.232 0.071 0.273 0.196 0.077 0.150 0.072 0.079 -0.300 -0.369 0.069 0.832
9 BTAR* 0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.004 -0.002 0.001 0.004 -0.002 0.001 0.004 -0.002 0.024
Finland 2 STD 0.453 0.415 0.038 0.572 0.524 0.048 0.612 0.561 0.051 0.615 0.563 0.052 0.615 0.563 0.052 1.069
3 STD 0.461 0.420 0.040 0.530 0.484 0.046 0.542 0.495 0.047 0.542 0.495 0.048 0.542 0.495 0.048 0.957
5 BTAR* 0.756 0.665 0.090 0.386 0.340 0.046 1.113 0.979 0.117 1.188 1.013 0.125 0.935 0.842 0.115 0.932
6 SYM 0.630 0.536 0.093 0.985 0.856 0.129 1.296 1.134 0.163 1.007 0.887 0.120 0.897 0.787 0.110 0.905
7 BTAR* 0.133 0.128 0.005 0.096 0.092 0.004 0.145 0.138 0.015 0.166 0.156 0.020 0.195 0.173 0.020 0.199
8 MTAR* -0.029 -0.040 0.010 -0.025 -0.034 0.009 -0.040 -0.048 0.008 -0.056 -0.060 0.004 -0.075 -0.071 -0.003 -0.097
10 MTAR* 0.101 0.095 0.006 0.107 0.101 0.006 0.196 0.177 0.030 0.364 0.320 0.045 0.363 0.319 0.044 0.363
France 4 BTAR* 0.526 0.481 0.045 0.285 0.261 0.024 1.218 1.071 0.085 1.064 0.991 0.112 0.670 0.594 0.096 0.788
5 SYM 0.244 0.228 0.016 0.351 0.318 0.033 0.527 0.472 0.056 0.661 0.585 0.076 0.717 0.631 0.086 0.716
8 MTAR* 0.913 0.821 0.092 0.909 0.818 0.091 1.153 1.023 0.131 1.100 0.965 0.135 0.939 0.825 0.114 0.984
9 STD 0.070 0.087 -0.017 0.076 0.095 -0.018 0.077 0.095 -0.019 0.077 0.095 -0.019 0.077 0.095 -0.019 -0.046
Germany 2 STD 0.072 0.050 0.022 0.108 0.075 0.033 0.133 0.093 0.041 0.140 0.098 0.043 0.141 0.098 0.043 0.470
3 STD 0.125 0.106 0.019 0.160 0.136 0.024 0.172 0.146 0.026 0.173 0.147 0.026 0.173 0.147 0.026 0.383
4 STD 0.222 0.215 0.008 0.282 0.273 0.010 0.385 0.372 0.013 0.436 0.421 0.015 0.453 0.437 0.015 0.626
5 MTAR* 0.178 0.162 0.015 0.278 0.254 0.024 0.506 0.453 0.047 0.726 0.642 0.078 0.534 0.466 0.071 0.497
8.1 MTAR* 0.503 0.452 0.050 0.613 0.551 0.061 0.587 0.531 0.066 0.601 0.542 0.069 0.629 0.564 0.073 0.735
8.2 SYM 0.460 0.405 0.055 0.692 0.609 0.083 0.840 0.739 0.101 0.842 0.741 0.101 0.822 0.723 0.099 0.821
9.1 TAR* 0.118 0.106 0.013 0.150 0.134 0.016 0.184 0.165 0.019 0.140 0.127 0.013 0.040 0.041 -0.001 0.273
9.2 MTAR* 0.213 0.181 0.032 0.309 0.262 0.047 0.342 0.288 0.054 0.293 0.243 0.050 0.216 0.173 0.043 0.759
Ireland 1 TAR* 0.416 0.378 0.038 0.468 0.425 0.043 0.509 0.497 0.065 0.589 0.622 0.085 0.762 0.682 0.093 0.780
2 MTAR* 0.523 0.446 0.077 0.612 0.521 0.090 0.696 0.599 0.096 0.730 0.635 0.093 0.648 0.571 0.077 0.635
4 TAR* 0.421 0.380 0.041 0.453 0.408 0.044 0.467 0.450 0.059 0.482 0.538 0.073 0.619 0.600 0.082 0.699
5 TAR* 0.418 0.381 0.038 0.398 0.362 0.036 0.432 0.424 0.048 0.525 0.491 0.062 0.617 0.552 0.074 0.664
6 SYM 1.067 0.937 0.130 0.992 0.873 0.120 1.011 0.889 0.122 1.012 0.890 0.122 1.012 0.890 0.122 1.012
9.1 BTAR* 0.138 0.122 0.016 0.146 0.130 0.017 0.147 0.130 0.017 0.147 0.130 0.017 0.147 0.130 0.017 0.215
9.2 BTAR* 0.238 0.210 0.028 0.220 0.194 0.026 0.221 0.195 0.026 0.221 0.195 0.026 0.221 0.195 0.026 0.283
Italy 2 SYM 0.146 0.122 0.024 0.410 0.357 0.053 0.599 0.526 0.073 0.553 0.485 0.067 0.604 0.531 0.073 0.604
4.1 MTAR* 0.250 0.244 0.006 0.290 0.283 0.007 0.462 0.432 0.038 0.638 0.567 0.076 0.635 0.556 0.078 0.623
4.2 MTAR* 0.253 0.252 0.001 0.369 0.367 0.001 0.470 0.462 0.033 0.713 0.648 0.083 0.840 0.736 0.104 0.811
5 MTAR* 0.582 0.520 0.062 0.353 0.316 0.038 1.155 1.018 0.128 0.984 0.864 0.122 0.711 0.627 0.082 0.723
7 MTAR* 0.192 0.186 0.006 0.260 0.252 0.009 0.234 0.234 0.020 0.309 0.289 0.036 0.398 0.353 0.048 0.419
8 BTAR* 0.328 0.303 0.025 0.430 0.397 0.033 0.400 0.377 0.023 0.288 0.291 -0.002 -0.122 -0.027 -0.095 0.641
10 BTAR* 0.169 0.164 0.005 0.233 0.226 0.007 0.268 0.263 0.005 0.264 0.266 -0.002 0.226 0.248 -0.022 0.348
Netherlands 2 MTAR* 0.154 0.133 0.020 0.235 0.204 0.031 0.312 0.272 0.046 0.417 0.364 0.058 0.524 0.460 0.066 0.557
4 TAR* 0.806 0.719 0.087 0.465 0.415 0.050 0.738 0.657 0.081 0.883 0.784 0.100 0.948 0.837 0.110 0.983
7 BTAR* 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.004 -0.004 0.000 -0.015 -0.014 -0.001 0.038
8.1 STD 0.014 -0.016 0.030 0.018 -0.020 0.039 0.026 -0.029 0.054 0.030 -0.033 0.063 0.031 -0.035 0.067 0.516
8.2 STD 0.117 0.084 0.033 0.156 0.111 0.044 0.173 0.123 0.049 0.175 0.125 0.050 0.175 0.125 0.050 0.556
Portugal 2 BTAR* 0.336 0.317 0.019 0.349 0.329 0.020 0.512 0.463 0.028 0.596 0.533 0.032 0.627 0.558 0.034 0.826
3 SYM -0.121 -0.080 -0.042 0.220 0.197 0.024 0.335 0.298 0.038 0.413 0.365 0.048 0.453 0.398 0.054 0.455
4.1 SYM 0.141 0.126 0.015 0.201 0.178 0.023 0.360 0.318 0.042 0.444 0.391 0.053 0.387 0.340 0.047 0.379
4.2 MTAR* 0.458 0.416 0.042 0.307 0.279 0.028 0.720 0.638 0.082 0.737 0.646 0.091 0.615 0.541 0.074 0.629
8.1 STD 0.389 0.339 0.050 0.470 0.410 0.060 0.490 0.427 0.063 0.491 0.428 0.063 0.491 0.428 0.063 1.009
8.2 SYM 0.125 0.115 0.011 0.223 0.199 0.024 0.364 0.322 0.042 0.508 0.448 0.060 0.526 0.463 0.063 0.506
Spain 2 TAR* 0.176 0.171 0.004 0.293 0.286 0.007 0.390 0.385 0.005 0.392 0.399 -0.007 0.259 0.302 -0.044 0.837
3 MTAR* 0.462 0.394 0.068 0.209 0.178 0.031 0.834 0.733 0.102 0.732 0.644 0.088 0.640 0.563 0.077 0.632
4 SYM 0.646 0.552 0.094 0.876 0.766 0.109 1.055 0.926 0.129 0.864 0.761 0.103 0.859 0.755 0.104 0.854
5 MTAR* 0.493 0.470 0.022 0.182 0.174 0.008 0.880 0.783 0.097 0.842 0.739 0.104 0.711 0.627 0.084 0.721
6 SYM 0.419 0.376 0.044 0.590 0.525 0.064 0.905 0.802 0.103 1.023 0.901 0.121 0.802 0.704 0.098 0.809
7 STD 0.203 0.185 0.018 0.224 0.204 0.019 0.306 0.280 0.027 0.345 0.315 0.030 0.355 0.324 0.031 0.625
8 MTAR* 0.508 0.472 0.037 0.494 0.458 0.036 0.557 0.508 0.052 0.643 0.576 0.069 0.720 0.637 0.084 0.758
10.1 MTAR* 0.649 0.571 0.078 0.626 0.551 0.075 0.880 0.774 0.106 1.091 0.959 0.131 0.998 0.866 0.119 1.002
10.2 STD 0.230 0.201 0.029 0.323 0.282 0.041 0.375 0.328 0.048 0.385 0.336 0.049 0.385 0.336 0.049 0.789
Table 2: Multipliers for a +1% shock in the monetary policy rate
country bankrate impact 1 month 3 months 6 months 12 months longrun
Austria 2 0.26 0.34 0.74 0.69 0.63 0.61
3 0.41 0.55 0.72 0.71 0.59 0.61
4 0.34 0.55 0.68 0.63 0.62 0.63
7 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
8 0.20 0.31 0.40 0.43 0.44 0.44
Belgium 2 0.22 0.22 0.73 1.20 1.42 0.72
3 0.43 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46
4.1 0.49 0.51 0.82 1.10 1.03 0.92
4.2 0.50 0.63 0.72 0.78 0.83 0.85
5 0.28 0.34 0.47 0.48 0.30 0.34
8 0.43 0.45 0.43 0.39 0.32 0.83
9 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
Finland 2 0.39 0.52 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.59
3 0.41 0.49 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51
5 0.78 0.95 1.09 1.01 0.93 0.93
6 0.67 0.90 0.93 0.90 0.90 0.90
7 0.10 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.20
8 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.10
10 0.07 0.17 0.28 0.35 0.36 0.36
France 4 0.45 0.67 1.06 0.80 0.78 0.79
5 0.29 0.38 0.52 0.63 0.70 0.72
8 0.94 1.19 1.26 0.97 0.96 0.98
9 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Germany 2 0.10 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19
3 0.13 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
4 0.18 0.26 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.33
5 0.19 0.44 0.59 0.50 0.48 0.50
8.1 0.50 0.71 0.81 0.80 0.77 0.73
8.2 0.46 0.69 0.84 0.84 0.82 0.82
9.1 0.13 0.22 0.26 0.22 0.18 0.27
9.2 0.24 0.34 7.00 8.22 9.53 0.76
Ireland 1 0.46 0.83 0.69 0.78 0.81 0.78
2 0.48 0.79 0.84 0.84 0.67 0.63
4 0.43 0.72 0.61 0.69 0.72 0.70
5 0.41 0.64 0.50 0.64 0.62 0.66
6 1.07 0.99 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
9.1 0.14 0.22 0.19 0.24 0.26 0.22
9.2 0.24 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28
Italy 2 0.17 0.40 0.56 0.60 0.60 0.60
4.1 0.17 0.45 0.60 0.69 0.63 0.62
4.2 0.17 0.49 0.79 0.83 0.81 0.81
5 0.64 0.77 1.05 0.65 0.75 0.72
7 0.13 0.34 0.42 0.47 0.44 0.42
8 0.29 0.53 0.53 0.49 0.36 0.64
10 0.12 0.32 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
Netherlands 2 0.20 0.69 0.42 0.26 0.66 0.56
4 0.82 0.89 1.02 0.98 0.98 0.98
7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.04
8.1 0.18 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23
8.2 0.16 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
Portugal 2 0.28 0.70 0.92 0.97 0.93 0.83
3 -0.15 0.22 0.34 0.41 0.45 0.46
4.1 0.14 0.19 0.25 0.31 0.36 0.38
4.2 0.43 0.29 0.72 0.75 0.61 0.63
8.1 0.40 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50
8.2 0.15 0.25 0.38 0.46 0.50 0.51
Spain 2 0.17 0.44 0.80 0.62 0.50 0.84
3 0.35 0.72 0.74 0.61 0.63 0.63
4 0.81 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85
5 0.36 0.54 0.88 0.74 0.73 0.72
6 0.41 0.60 0.74 0.79 0.81 0.81
7 0.20 0.27 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
8 0.47 0.80 0.89 0.80 0.77 0.76
10.1 0.76 0.87 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00
10.2 0.24 0.33 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.39
multiplier
Table 3: Asymmetries in the pass-through
dependent variable  
impact 1 mth 3 mth 6 mths 12mths impact 1 mth 3 mth 6 mths 12mths impact 1 mth 3 mth 6 mths 12 mths impact 1 mth 3 mth 6 mths 12 mths
independent variables
constant 0.280 0.309 0.557 0.532 0.526 0.439 0.524 0.651 0.851 0.683 0.304 0.331 0.667 0.558 0.584 0.461 0.545 0.773 0.876 0.746
13.499 15.255 6.494 18.847 10.147 6.419 7.944 1.984 9.020 3.425 14.479 16.190 7.839 19.666 11.390 6.662 8.146 2.386 9.259 3.779
expected shock dummy * deposit dummy -0.043 -0.033 -0.032 -0.176 -0.128 -0.009 -0.024 -0.072 -0.058 -0.062
-1.132 -0.896 -0.203 -3.384 -1.334 -0.243 -0.667 -0.399 -1.112 -0.561
expected shock dummy * loan dummy 0.112 0.100 0.095 0.170 0.131 0.088 0.094 0.123 0.086 0.084
3.286 3.012 0.673 3.654 1.534 2.742 3.033 0.804 1.935 0.900
positive shock dummy * deposit dummy -0.079 -0.066 -0.352 -0.221 -0.288 -0.035 -0.047 -0.472 -0.096 -0.258
-2.042 -1.755 -2.242 -4.215 -3.045 -0.928 -1.286 -2.648 -1.846 -2.369
positive shock dummy * loan dummy 0.056 0.047 -0.052 0.112 0.047 0.025 0.034 0.033 0.024 0.025
1.626 1.398 -0.375 2.409 0.551 0.775 1.075 0.218 0.542 0.268
N2 - mortgage loans to households -0.144 -0.175 -0.277 -0.167 -0.168 -0.135 -0.166 -0.356 -0.161 -0.203
-2.688 -3.395 -1.081 -2.260 -1.080 -2.484 -3.169 -1.405 -2.175 -1.315
N3 - consumer loans to households -0.115 -0.184 -0.342 -0.254 -0.275 -0.106 -0.174 -0.423 -0.248 -0.311
-1.933 -3.193 -1.195 -3.083 -1.583 -1.753 -2.985 -1.495 -3.002 -1.804
N4 - short-term loans to enterprises 0.005 -0.122 -0.068 0.022 0.000 0.014 -0.112 -0.147 0.028 -0.035
0.088 -2.406 -0.270 0.307 0.001 0.263 -2.188 -0.593 0.388 -0.231
N5 - medium and long-term loans to enterprises -0.058 -0.239 -0.044 0.015 -0.076 -0.049 -0.230 -0.122 0.021 -0.111
-1.040 -4.433 -0.166 0.200 -0.469 -0.865 -4.202 -0.461 0.275 -0.686
N7 - current account deposits -0.252 -0.318 -0.534 -0.493 -0.448 -0.261 -0.326 -0.463 -0.498 -0.416
-4.094 -5.339 -1.806 -5.793 -2.491 -4.177 -5.405 -1.586 -5.839 -2.338
N8 - time deposits 0.004 -0.028 -0.228 -0.178 -0.275 -0.005 -0.037 -0.154 -0.183 -0.242
0.078 -0.547 -0.902 -2.438 -1.785 -0.087 -0.710 -0.617 -2.507 -1.587
N9 - savings accounts -0.303 -0.390 0.367 -0.458 -0.090 -0.313 -0.401 0.453 -0.464 -0.052
-4.886 -6.527 1.234 -5.355 -0.500 -4.986 -6.604 1.542 -5.414 -0.293
Austria -0.145 -0.114 0.052 -0.128 0.003 -0.145 -0.115 0.056 -0.129 0.005
-2.030 -1.663 0.153 -1.305 0.017 -2.011 -1.646 0.167 -1.304 0.025
Belgium -0.057 -0.040 -0.102 -0.162 -0.064 -0.057 -0.040 -0.101 -0.162 -0.063
-0.890 -0.647 -0.331 -1.831 -0.341 -0.881 -0.641 -0.331 -1.827 -0.342
Finland -0.032 -0.048 0.079 -0.181 -0.041 -0.033 -0.048 0.082 -0.181 -0.040
-0.484 -0.744 0.245 -1.958 -0.211 -0.483 -0.738 0.257 -1.955 -0.207
Germany -0.115 -0.030 0.441 -0.183 0.205 -0.115 -0.030 0.441 -0.183 0.205
-1.835 -0.495 1.471 -2.122 1.124 -1.813 -0.489 1.491 -2.116 1.135
Ireland 0.096 0.093 -0.228 -0.180 -0.082 0.098 0.096 -0.252 -0.179 -0.092
1.463 1.480 -0.729 -2.004 -0.428 1.487 1.503 -0.814 -1.979 -0.487
Italy -0.177 -0.137 -0.042 -0.259 -0.150 -0.179 -0.139 -0.028 -0.260 -0.144
-2.705 -2.167 -0.134 -2.870 -0.786 -2.696 -2.163 -0.091 -2.874 -0.761
Netherlands -0.130 -0.184 -0.057 -0.262 -0.032 -0.130 -0.184 -0.053 -0.262 -0.031
-1.831 -2.686 -0.167 -2.684 -0.157 -1.815 -2.655 -0.157 -2.679 -0.150
Portugal -0.244 -0.167 -0.021 -0.198 0.010 -0.244 -0.167 -0.018 -0.198 0.011
-3.596 -2.554 -0.064 -2.115 0.049 -3.557 -2.524 -0.055 -2.112 0.057
Spain -0.003 -0.030 0.165 -0.074 0.047 -0.004 -0.031 0.176 -0.074 0.052
-0.048 -0.484 0.535 -0.827 0.251 -0.067 -0.498 0.578 -0.834 0.280
adjusted R2 5.2% 4.1% -0.5% 11.9% 1.6% 30.9% 31.7% 1.6% 34.0% 2.6% 3.0% 2.1% 1.2% 11.0% 3.7% 29.1% 29.8% 4.1% 33.7% 4.4%
number of observations 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
Note: For each independent variable, the first row reports the estimated coefficient, the second row reports the t-statistic in italics.
multipliers 
Table 4: Determinants of the pass-through
dependent variable  
impact 1 mth 3 mths 6 mths 12 mths impact 1 mth 3 mths 6 mths 12mths impact 1 mth 3 mths 6 mths 12 mths impact 1 mth 3 mths 6 mths 12mths
independent variables
constant 0.280 0.309 0.467 0.516 0.477 0.439 0.524 0.802 0.863 0.762 0.280 0.309 0.647 0.547 0.575 0.439 0.524 0.499 0.839 0.603
9.489 10.723 11.952 13.214 11.709 4.356 5.391 6.061 6.685 5.226 9.489 10.723 3.876 13.316 6.027 4.356 5.391 0.799 5.762 1.652
expected shock dummy * deposit dummy -0.043 -0.033 -0.145 -0.181 -0.185 -0.009 -0.024 -0.051 -0.054 -0.051 -0.043 -0.033 0.081 -0.171 -0.070 -0.009 -0.024 -0.093 -0.062 -0.072
-0.796 -0.630 -2.012 -2.515 -2.466 -0.165 -0.452 -0.706 -0.755 -0.639 -0.796 -0.630 0.263 -2.256 -0.397 -0.165 -0.452 -0.269 -0.771 -0.358
expected shock dummy * loan dummy 0.112 0.100 0.181 0.181 0.182 0.088 0.094 0.114 0.091 0.086 0.112 0.100 0.010 0.158 0.080 0.088 0.094 0.133 0.080 0.082
2.310 2.117 2.806 2.821 2.708 1.861 2.059 1.839 1.500 1.264 2.310 2.117 0.035 2.336 0.511 1.861 2.059 0.454 1.178 0.478
N2 - mortgage loans to households -0.144 -0.175 -0.151 -0.136 -0.096 -0.144 -0.175 -0.404 -0.197 -0.241
-1.824 -2.304 -1.457 -1.349 -0.840 -1.824 -2.304 -0.826 -1.733 -0.844
N3 - consumer loans to households -0.115 -0.184 -0.183 -0.245 -0.203 -0.115 -0.184 -0.501 -0.263 -0.348
-1.312 -2.167 -1.587 -2.171 -1.592 -1.312 -2.167 -0.919 -2.071 -1.093
N4 - short-term loans to enterprises 0.005 -0.122 -0.004 0.009 0.022 0.005 -0.122 -0.132 0.036 -0.021
0.060 -1.633 -0.035 0.089 0.193 0.060 -1.633 -0.276 0.319 -0.076
N5 - medium and long-term loans to enterprises -0.058 -0.239 0.023 0.016 -0.068 -0.058 -0.239 -0.112 0.015 -0.085
-0.706 -3.008 0.214 0.148 -0.568 -0.706 -3.008 -0.219 0.129 -0.286
N7 - current account deposits -0.252 -0.318 -0.454 -0.485 -0.399 -0.252 -0.318 -0.614 -0.500 -0.496
-2.778 -3.623 -3.803 -4.167 -3.036 -2.778 -3.623 -1.091 -3.813 -1.508
N8 - time deposits 0.004 -0.028 -0.090 -0.161 -0.200 0.004 -0.028 -0.367 -0.194 -0.349
0.053 -0.371 -0.879 -1.620 -1.776 0.053 -0.371 -0.761 -1.723 -1.241
N9 - savings accounts -0.303 -0.390 -0.436 -0.526 -0.535 -0.303 -0.390 1.170 -0.389 0.354
-3.316 -4.429 -3.633 -4.497 -4.045 -3.316 -4.429 2.065 -2.952 1.071
Austria -0.145 -0.114 -0.213 -0.155 -0.138 -0.145 -0.114 0.318 -0.102 0.145
-1.377 -1.128 -1.546 -1.151 -0.909 -1.377 -1.128 0.488 -0.671 0.382
Belgium -0.057 -0.040 -0.208 -0.128 -0.058 -0.057 -0.040 0.005 -0.196 -0.069
-0.604 -0.439 -1.679 -1.056 -0.427 -0.604 -0.439 0.008 -1.437 -0.202
Finland -0.032 -0.048 -0.167 -0.205 -0.160 -0.032 -0.048 0.324 -0.157 0.078
-0.329 -0.505 -1.284 -1.622 -1.121 -0.329 -0.505 0.530 -1.099 0.218
Germany -0.115 -0.030 -0.261 -0.243 -0.170 -0.115 -0.030 1.142 -0.123 0.580
-1.245 -0.336 -2.159 -2.057 -1.277 -1.245 -0.336 2.001 -0.926 1.739
Ireland 0.096 0.093 -0.207 -0.211 -0.083 0.096 0.093 -0.250 -0.149 -0.080
0.993 1.005 -1.635 -1.715 -0.597 0.993 1.005 -0.419 -1.076 -0.229
Italy -0.177 -0.137 -0.292 -0.293 -0.268 -0.177 -0.137 0.208 -0.225 -0.032
-1.836 -1.471 -2.305 -2.372 -1.921 -1.836 -1.471 0.348 -1.617 -0.091
Netherlands -0.130 -0.184 -0.347 -0.317 -0.193 -0.130 -0.184 0.234 -0.207 0.128
-1.243 -1.823 -2.535 -2.372 -1.276 -1.243 -1.823 0.362 -1.374 0.338
Portugal -0.244 -0.167 -0.303 -0.254 -0.169 -0.244 -0.167 0.262 -0.141 0.189
-2.441 -1.733 -2.314 -1.986 -1.172 -2.441 -1.733 0.423 -0.980 0.523
Spain -0.003 -0.030 -0.070 -0.093 -0.068 -0.003 -0.030 0.401 -0.054 0.162
-0.033 -0.328 -0.564 -0.762 -0.495 -0.033 -0.328 0.681 -0.397 0.472
adjusted R2 4.5% 3.3% 10.7% 13.0% 12.2% 25.2% 26.1% 31.5% 36.4% 24.6% 4.5% 3.3% -1.5% 9.6% -1.1% 25.2% 26.1% 4.8% 24.0% 1.1%
number of observations 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130
Note: For each independent variable, the first row reports the estimated coefficient, the second row reports the t-statistic in italics.
multipliers based on +1% shock multipliers based on -1% shock
Table 5: Convergence in the pass-through
dependent variable  multipliers for +1% shock multipliers for -1% shock
impact 1 mth 3 mths 6 mths 12 mths impact 1 mth 3 mths 6 mths 12mths impact 1 mth 3 mths 6 mths 12 mths impact 1 mth 3 mths 6 mths 12mths
independent variables
constant 0.644 0.558 0.544 0.468 0.570 0.866 0.626 0.903 0.780 0.614 0.280 0.309 0.647 0.547 0.575 0.439 0.524 0.499 0.839 0.603
10.691 10.501 9.592 8.848 8.445 3.781 3.208 4.605 4.069 2.579 9.489 10.723 3.876 13.316 6.027 4.356 5.391 0.799 5.762 1.652
expected shock dummy * deposit dummy -0.029 0.034 0.034 0.140 0.233 -0.088 -0.102 -0.114 0.006 -0.057 -0.043 -0.033 0.081 -0.171 -0.070 -0.009 -0.024 -0.093 -0.062 -0.072
-0.258 0.349 0.323 1.431 1.871 -0.700 -0.944 -1.060 0.058 -0.432 -0.796 -0.630 0.263 -2.256 -0.397 -0.165 -0.452 -0.269 -0.771 -0.358
expected shock dummy * loan dummy -0.231 -0.267 -0.245 -0.229 -0.342 -0.188 -0.171 -0.140 -0.134 -0.136 0.112 0.100 0.010 0.158 0.080 0.088 0.094 0.133 0.080 0.082
-2.327 -3.053 -2.627 -2.630 -3.076 -1.756 -1.864 -1.524 -1.490 -1.219 2.310 2.117 0.035 2.336 0.511 1.861 2.059 0.454 1.178 0.478
N2 - mortgage loans to households 0.068 0.149 0.059 0.125 0.090 -0.144 -0.175 -0.404 -0.197 -0.241
0.380 0.974 0.385 0.832 0.485 -1.824 -2.304 -0.826 -1.733 -0.844
N3 - consumer loans to households 0.381 0.016 0.054 0.035 -0.064 -0.115 -0.184 -0.501 -0.263 -0.348
1.907 0.096 0.316 0.210 -0.308 -1.312 -2.167 -0.919 -2.071 -1.093
N4 - short-term loans to enterprises 0.035 0.144 0.064 -0.039 -0.128 0.005 -0.122 -0.132 0.036 -0.021
0.199 0.958 0.425 -0.266 -0.698 0.060 -1.633 -0.276 0.319 -0.076
N5 - medium and long-term loans to enterprises 0.005 -0.130 -0.026 -0.084 -0.163 -0.058 -0.239 -0.112 0.015 -0.085
0.027 -0.813 -0.164 -0.534 -0.838 -0.706 -3.008 -0.219 0.129 -0.286
N7 - current account deposits 0.266 0.509 0.679 0.476 0.501 -0.252 -0.318 -0.614 -0.500 -0.496
1.288 2.890 3.842 2.753 2.334 -2.778 -3.623 -1.091 -3.813 -1.508
N8 - time deposits 0.062 0.175 0.118 0.135 0.460 0.004 -0.028 -0.367 -0.194 -0.349
0.351 1.162 0.778 0.915 2.505 0.053 -0.371 -0.761 -1.723 -1.241
N9 - savings accounts 0.387 0.449 0.355 0.297 0.584 -0.303 -0.390 1.170 -0.389 0.354
1.866 2.535 1.999 1.708 2.707 -3.316 -4.429 2.065 -2.952 1.071
Austria -0.531 -0.353 -0.753 -0.525 -0.368 -0.145 -0.114 0.318 -0.102 0.145
-2.228 -1.734 -3.689 -2.629 -1.484 -1.377 -1.128 0.488 -0.671 0.382
Belgium -0.501 -0.238 -0.526 -0.279 0.052 -0.057 -0.040 0.005 -0.196 -0.069
-2.331 -1.300 -2.861 -1.549 0.233 -0.604 -0.439 0.008 -1.437 -0.202
Finland -0.338 -0.166 -0.574 -0.531 -0.376 -0.032 -0.048 0.324 -0.157 0.078
-1.508 -0.868 -2.983 -2.823 -1.611 -0.329 -0.505 0.530 -1.099 0.218
Germany -0.431 -0.174 -0.363 -0.294 -0.033 -0.115 -0.030 1.142 -0.123 0.580
-2.062 -0.976 -2.025 -1.675 -0.153 -1.245 -0.336 2.001 -0.926 1.739
Ireland -0.460 -0.375 -0.674 -0.556 -0.386 0.096 0.093 -0.250 -0.149 -0.080
-2.106 -2.013 -3.598 -3.038 -1.697 0.993 1.005 -0.419 -1.076 -0.229
Italy -0.393 -0.272 -0.446 -0.433 0.020 -0.177 -0.137 0.208 -0.225 -0.032
-1.791 -1.455 -2.375 -2.355 0.087 -1.836 -1.471 0.348 -1.617 -0.091
Netherlands -0.227 -0.317 -0.572 -0.437 -0.343 -0.130 -0.184 0.234 -0.207 0.128
-0.957 -1.568 -2.817 -2.200 -1.391 -1.243 -1.823 0.362 -1.374 0.338
Portugal -0.263 -0.354 -0.683 -0.633 -0.444 -0.244 -0.167 0.262 -0.141 0.189
-1.158 -1.828 -3.514 -3.331 -1.880 -2.441 -1.733 0.423 -0.980 0.523
Spain -0.166 0.021 -0.282 -0.318 -0.091 -0.003 -0.030 0.401 -0.054 0.162
-0.769 0.117 -1.525 -1.758 -0.407 -0.033 -0.328 0.681 -0.397 0.472
adjusted R2 2.8% 6.8% 4.8% 7.7% 11.5% 6.0% 15.7% 23.8% 18.6% 26.3% 4.5% 3.3% -1.5% 9.6% -1.1% 25.2% 26.1% 4.8% 24.0% 1.1%
number of observations 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130
Note: For each independent variable, the first row reports the estimated coefficient, the second row reports the t-statistic in italics.
Table A1: Unit root tests
I(?) I(?)
country bankrate t(level) t(diff) 10% 5% F(level) F(diff) 10% 5%
Austria 2 -0.46 -2.68 1 2 2.57 3.89 2 2
3 -0.64 -3.33 1 1 1.80 5.95 1 2
4 -0.88 -2.85 1 2 1.44 4.16 2 2
7 -2.33 -4.44 1 1 2.75 9.95 1 1
8 -0.71 -2.96 1 1 1.02 4.38 2 2
Belgium 2 -1.62 -4.93 1 1 7.38 12.15 0 0
3 -1.56 -4.51 1 1 2.83 10.19 1 1
4.1 -0.81 -4.07 1 1 2.74 8.36 1 1
4.2 -0.62 -3.98 1 1 1.16 7.93 1 1
5 -2.20 -3.98 1 1 3.84 7.90 1 1
8 -0.62 -3.84 1 1 2.01 7.53 1 1
9 -0.15 -2.36 2 2 1.38 3.69 2 2
Finland 2 -1.03 -3.44 1 1 2.38 5.97 1 2
3 -0.85 -3.64 1 1 2.53 6.67 1 1
5 -0.64 -5.09 1 1 1.60 13.01 1 1
6 -0.62 -4.14 1 1 1.86 8.65 1 1
7 -1.05 -4.28 1 1 0.93 9.15 1 1
8 -1.91 -4.48 1 1 1.89 10.02 1 1
10 -1.01 -2.90 1 1 1.47 4.21 2 2
France 4 -0.94 -5.17 1 1 1.54 13.35 1 1
5 -0.64 -5.16 1 1 1.33 13.31 1 1
8 -1.01 -3.68 1 1 1.86 6.81 1 1
9 -2.51 -4.78 1 1 3.38 11.43 1 1
Germany 2 -1.85 -4.23 1 1 4.80 8.97 1 1
3 -1.32 -4.22 1 1 1.08 8.95 1 1
4 -0.96 -2.56 2 2 1.48 3.47 2 2
5 -1.82 -4.50 1 1 5.06 10.22 1 1
8.1 -1.16 -3.10 1 1 1.61 4.80 2 2
8.2 -1.42 -3.30 1 1 1.90 5.45 2 2
9.1 -1.24 -2.66 1 2 1.47 3.62 2 2
9.2 -1.18 -3.04 1 1 2.43 4.65 2 2
Ireland 1 -1.13 -3.76 1 1 1.47 7.06 1 1
2 -1.52 -4.49 1 1 1.23 10.08 1 1
4 -1.05 -3.66 1 1 1.26 6.69 1 1
5 -0.89 -3.61 1 1 1.68 6.53 1 1
6 -0.70 -3.44 1 1 1.60 5.92 1 2
9.1 -1.35 -4.05 1 1 1.54 8.19 1 1
9.2 -1.26 -4.09 1 1 1.09 8.38 1 1
Italy 2 -0.70 -4.82 1 1 0.84 11.64 1 1
4.1 -1.61 -3.00 1 1 1.83 4.98 2 2
4.2 -1.78 -2.27 2 2 2.43 2.62 2 2
5 -0.55 -5.47 1 1 1.85 15.15 1 1
7 -1.25 -2.59 1 2 1.97 3.36 2 2
8 -0.93 -3.33 1 1 2.16 5.55 1 2
10 -1.49 -2.51 2 2 1.78 3.17 2 2
Netherlands 2 -1.80 -3.97 1 1 3.89 7.91 1 1
4 -0.68 -4.05 1 1 1.43 8.21 1 1
7 -1.02 -5.85 1 1 2.30 17.14 1 1
8.1 -1.41 -3.44 1 1 2.41 5.92 1 2
8.2 -1.75 -3.75 1 1 3.30 7.02 1 1
Portugal 2 -1.24 -2.88 1 1 1.25 4.33 2 2
3 -2.18 -6.82 1 1 2.69 23.30 1 1
4.1 -1.09 -3.54 1 1 0.76 6.82 1 1
4.2 -1.14 -5.15 1 1 0.78 13.54 1 1
8.1 -1.20 -3.40 1 1 1.06 5.84 1 2
8.2 -0.60 -3.45 1 1 1.03 6.22 1 2
Spain 2 -1.68 -2.75 1 2 2.48 3.85 2 2
3 -1.53 -6.88 1 1 1.34 23.70 1 1
4 -0.69 -5.06 1 1 1.67 12.83 1 1
5 -0.73 -5.02 1 1 1.18 12.62 1 1
6 -0.93 -3.18 1 1 1.23 5.11 2 2
7 -1.01 -2.47 2 2 1.01 3.21 2 2
8 -0.86 -3.75 1 1 1.83 7.03 1 1
10.1 -0.86 -3.13 1 1 1.20 4.94 2 2
10.2 -1.16 -2.69 1 2 1.82 3.63 2 2
MP rate -0.81 -3.99 1 1 1.42 7.97 1 1
exp MP rate -0.69 -4.13 1 1 1.81 8.57 1 1
unexp MP rate -5.99 -10.03 0 0 18 50.52 0 0
Table A2: The longrun relationship between bank rate and money market rate and symmetric cointegration tests
Panel A: Monetary policy rates
regression intercept t-stat slope t-stat DW DF ADF coint?
MP = θ0 + θ MPE -0.02 -0.26 1.00 51.63 2.46 -9.07 yes
Panel B: Bankrates
country bankrate intercept t-stat slope t-stat DW DF ADF coint?
Austria 2 3.42 49.45 0.61 32.49 0.86 -3.84 yes
3 4.73 60.13 0.61 28.52 0.59 -3.22 yes
4 3.77 45.36 0.63 27.66 0.72 -3.61 yes
7 0.21 7.85 0.02 3.09 0.14 -2.59 no
8 0.95 11.62 0.44 19.48 0.49 -2.86 yes
Belgium 2 3.37 14.79 0.72 11.67 0.26 -2.46 -3.23 yes
3 5.54 28.52 0.45 8.57 0.23 -2.37 no
4.1 1.16 5.91 0.92 17.37 0.40 -2.23 -2.57 yes
4.2 4.62 23.61 0.85 16.01 0.23 -1.74 -0.69 no
5 5.06 14.04 0.34 3.50 0.13 -2.39 -3.85 yes
8 -0.09 -0.69 0.83 23.95 0.54 -2.43 -1.61 yes
9 2.52 77.89 0.02 2.67 0.45 -0.42 -1.98 yes
Finland 2 1.59 7.64 0.94 16.52 0.19 -1.14 -0.44 no
3 2.75 13.19 0.94 16.58 0.28 -1.56 -0.70 no
5 1.16 8.52 0.93 25.23 1.58 -5.75 yes
6 1.27 11.07 0.90 28.92 1.11 -4.31 yes
7 0.07 1.35 0.20 13.71 0.47 -3.28 yes
8 3.64 14.01 -0.10 -1.37 0.17 -0.97 no
10 0.24 3.20 0.36 17.96 0.31 -2.09 no
France 4 2.09 16.72 0.79 23.08 1.54 -5.68 yes
5 2.46 13.37 0.72 14.29 0.49 -2.72 -2.46 yes
8 0.10 0.97 0.98 35.87 0.77 -3.37 -2.73 yes
9 2.75 15.91 0.05 1.15 0.23 -1.81 no
Germany 2 3.55 11.62 0.56 6.78 0.15 -1.54 -2.66 no
3 9.82 69.92 0.19 5.07 0.08 -0.85 -0.55 no
4 6.52 26.62 0.50 7.47 0.05 -0.88 no
5 4.51 19.94 0.50 8.07 0.17 -2.19 -3.19 yes
8.1 -0.06 -0.96 0.73 41.64 0.48 -2.80 -1.65 yes
8.2 0.09 1.28 0.82 43.62 0.78 -3.44 -1.26 yes
9.1 1.01 9.24 0.27 9.17 0.07 -1.22 no
9.2 0.41 2.90 0.76 19.57 0.31 -1.65 no
Ireland 1 8.40 62.58 0.78 21.34 0.29 -2.02 -1.41 no
2 2.70 9.48 0.63 8.19 0.18 -2.23 -3.02 no
4 6.47 57.90 0.70 22.98 0.35 -2.04 -1.16 no
5 5.73 50.18 0.66 21.33 0.32 -2.31 -1.27 no
6 0.51 12.35 1.01 90.00 1.41 -5.28 yes
9.1 -0.53 -13.19 0.22 19.79 0.40 -2.31 yes
9.2 -0.63 -8.11 0.28 13.41 0.20 -1.98 -1.64 no
Italy 2 3.86 29.82 0.60 17.13 0.84 -4.04 -3.56 yes
4.1 3.74 33.06 0.62 20.23 0.39 -3.99 yes
4.2 0.70 5.59 0.81 23.73 0.42 -2.49 yes
5 2.35 23.52 0.72 26.51 1.58 -5.83 yes
7 -0.03 -0.49 0.42 26.27 0.56 -3.25 yes
8 0.74 7.49 0.64 23.91 0.40 -1.50 yes
10 0.40 3.66 0.35 11.62 0.13 -2.86 no
Netherlands 2 3.75 14.39 0.56 7.86 0.16 -1.24 -1.93 no
4 0.68 9.90 0.98 52.19 2.23 -8.01 -2.47 yes
7 0.27 6.78 0.04 3.46 0.09 -0.41 no
8.1 1.47 9.22 0.56 12.82 0.31 -2.23 no
8.2 2.22 11.72 0.46 8.87 0.19 -2.01 -2.59 no
Portugal 2 2.48 17.89 0.83 21.87 0.55 -3.56 yes
3 8.15 22.93 0.46 4.71 1.21 -4.74 -2.71 yes
4.1 6.10 23.44 0.38 5.47 0.27 -3.63 yes
4.2 3.21 15.59 0.63 11.47 0.69 -3.85 yes
8.1 0.62 3.58 0.74 16.06 0.32 -1.93 no
8.2 1.07 7.62 0.51 13.50 0.56 -2.76 -1.39 yes
Spain 2 2.19 14.78 0.84 20.76 0.40 -2.07 -1.24 yes
3 5.70 32.43 0.63 13.21 1.40 -5.72 yes
4 1.58 13.26 0.85 26.28 1.67 -6.06 yes
5 3.45 33.60 0.72 25.75 1.60 -5.97 yes
6 2.36 16.58 0.81 20.84 0.43 -2.51 -2.16 yes
7 0.52 6.39 0.40 18.16 0.23 -1.86 no
8 0.07 0.58 0.76 23.14 0.80 -3.60 yes
10.1 -0.15 -2.67 1.00 65.74 1.63 -6.19 -1.51 yes
10.2 0.33 4.10 0.55 25.24 0.34 -2.18 -1.57 no
Table A3: Optimal pass-through model selection
AIC optimal asymmetric cointegration symmetric pass-through
country bankrate TAR0 TAR* BTAR* MTAR0 MTAR* min AIC TAR model coint H0: ρ1=ρ2 H0: ρ1=ρ3 H0: ρ2=ρ3 coint? cointegration? model
Austria 2 -45.26 -45.63 -49.66 -45.83 -51.95 -51.95 MTAR* 9.06 6.37 yes, asym yes MTAR*
3 -48.98 -53.98 -47.43 -48.81 -53.86 -53.98 TAR* 9.03 6.54 yes, asym yes TAR*
4 -34.30 -34.83 -33.94 -33.77 -35.01 -35.01 MTAR* 6.71 1.59 yes, sym yes SYM
7 -238.55 -240.91 -240.36 -227.96 -231.35 -240.91 TAR* 9.04 10.20 yes, asym no TAR*
8 -51.31 -56.37 -57.11 -53.93 -55.21 -57.11 BTAR* 5.77 2.65 2.06 8.04 no yes SYM
Belgium 2 14.26 11.94 7.98 15.08 10.86 7.98 BTAR* 7.65 7.89 0.89 7.34 yes, asym yes BTAR*
3 0.61 -0.62 -5.65 -0.34 -2.82 -5.65 BTAR* 5.57 8.27 0.41 8.35 no no STD
4.1 30.80 29.44 29.82 30.65 22.09 22.09 MTAR* 6.91 8.56 yes, asym yes MTAR*
4.2 -6.05 -12.39 -10.28 -13.43 -18.74 -18.74 MTAR* 7.84 15.06 yes, asym no MTAR*
5 20.93 19.99 18.44 21.10 17.23 17.23 MTAR* 9.50 3.62 yes, asym yes MTAR*
8 -4.69 -5.74 -10.42 -6.22 -14.23 -14.23 MTAR* 5.44 9.97 no yes SYM
9 -146.36 -147.39 -166.95 -145.85 -146.28 -166.95 BTAR* 10.96 26.22 0.03 25.64 yes, asym yes BTAR*
Finland 2 -0.82 -1.94 -7.86 -0.01 -7.96 -7.96 MTAR* 4.63 9.03 no no STD
3 15.26 14.65 14.16 11.71 8.19 8.19 MTAR* 5.39 10.21 no no STD
5 40.21 38.04 31.95 40.55 37.80 31.95 BTAR* 6.26 7.04 0.00 9.32 (yes, asym) yes BTAR*
6 13.18 9.91 8.21 12.96 5.86 5.86 MTAR* 5.14 7.27 no yes SYM
7 -107.35 -110.60 -112.99 -101.09 -106.19 -112.99 BTAR* 11.77 8.39 7.07 6.53 yes, asym yes BTAR*
8 18.32 17.42 18.12 13.54 -47.75 -47.75 MTAR* 69.10 133.12 yes, asym no MTAR*
10 -82.04 -83.50 -82.41 -80.94 -87.99 -87.99 MTAR* 6.31 7.63 (yes, asym) no MTAR*
France 4 32.09 30.09 29.44 31.98 30.00 29.44 BTAR* 7.80 4.52 1.26 2.39 yes, asym yes BTAR*
5 20.05 18.57 18.20 21.47 15.13 15.13 MTAR* 3.96 5.93 no yes SYM
8 -11.21 -13.09 -20.88 -14.62 -25.06 -25.06 MTAR* 9.24 14.77 yes, asym yes MTAR*
9 -9.21 -12.25 -10.82 -9.69 -11.58 -12.25 TAR* 3.25 3.09 no no STD
Germany 2 20.60 17.70 13.83 20.66 16.71 13.83 BTAR* 5.13 6.37 0.42 5.47 no no STD
3 -83.63 -88.14 -90.13 -83.71 -86.18 -90.13 BTAR* 3.18 7.87 1.13 3.90 no no STD
4 -46.40 -49.48 -47.88 -43.92 -51.84 -51.84 MTAR* 4.75 8.53 no no STD
5 -5.56 -7.82 -11.00 -5.68 -30.39 -30.39 MTAR* 21.77 29.03 yes, asym yes MTAR*
8.1 -82.43 -83.80 -85.92 -80.99 -91.98 -91.98 MTAR* 7.81 11.33 yes, asym yes MTAR*
8.2 -53.89 -53.95 -57.41 -52.57 -59.22 -59.22 MTAR* 4.38 6.51 no yes SYM
9.1 -133.49 -136.21 -135.56 -123.24 -131.48 -136.21 TAR* 11.16 22.31 yes, asym no TAR*
9.2 -13.15 -15.48 -18.03 -13.50 -28.31 -28.31 MTAR* 10.91 18.36 yes, asym no MTAR*
Ireland 1 -34.51 -54.26 -42.57 -42.21 -44.95 -54.26 TAR* 13.70 27.01 yes, asym no TAR*
2 24.61 22.01 17.33 23.23 16.77 16.77 MTAR* 9.98 9.15 yes, asym no MTAR*
4 -44.14 -60.34 -45.21 -49.78 -53.61 -60.34 TAR* 10.89 21.57 yes, asym no TAR*
5 -56.33 -68.74 -67.15 -64.02 -65.79 -68.74 TAR* 9.33 18.65 yes, asym no TAR*
6 -82.55 -84.02 -83.90 -82.25 -82.94 -84.02 TAR* 14.81 1.47 yes, sym yes SYM
9.1 -133.32 -134.07 -149.02 -131.69 -135.64 -149.02 BTAR* 9.03 19.83 0.04 19.88 yes, asym yes BTAR*
9.2 -99.03 -100.34 -104.95 -99.36 -101.63 -104.95 BTAR* 3.75 7.90 0.29 7.97 yes, asym no BTAR*
Italy 2 15.33 14.46 12.21 15.12 12.99 12.21 BTAR* 2.75 4.63 0.07 4.62 no yes SYM
4.1 -36.71 -37.01 -40.05 -36.63 -42.76 -42.76 MTAR* 8.19 6.44 yes, asym yes MTAR*
4.2 -13.34 -13.71 -16.02 -14.55 -25.07 -25.07 MTAR* 9.56 12.13 yes, asym yes MTAR*
5 5.90 4.21 2.84 5.85 0.73 0.73 MTAR* 7.16 4.96 yes, asym yes MTAR*
7 -82.61 -85.87 -87.41 -83.53 -92.74 -92.74 MTAR* 7.88 10.70 yes, asym yes MTAR*
8 -42.70 -45.97 -54.11 -38.55 -43.62 -54.11 BTAR* 8.17 12.87 7.68 14.49 yes, asym yes BTAR*
10 -92.28 -92.69 -99.57 -92.46 -95.69 -99.57 BTAR* 7.27 8.97 7.72 9.24 yes, asym no BTAR*
Netherlands 2 13.16 12.16 11.75 12.98 -4.50 -4.50 MTAR* 13.70 19.25 yes, asym no MTAR*
4 -25.33 -30.47 -29.65 -25.01 -29.74 -30.47 TAR* 38.13 5.92 yes, asym yes TAR*
7 -208.53 -208.90 -222.25 -205.31 -205.79 -222.25 BTAR* 6.07 17.29 0.68 17.33 (yes, asym) no BTAR*
8.1 -2.54 -3.00 -10.97 -2.96 -5.69 -10.97 BTAR* 5.58 10.80 0.03 10.89 no no STD
8.2 -10.54 -11.51 -11.63 -10.51 -13.29 -13.29 MTAR* 4.31 2.69 no no STD
Portugal 2 1.25 -1.16 -10.81 0.93 -4.75 -10.81 BTAR* 7.76 14.26 0.42 14.30 yes, asym yes BTAR*
3 123.88 122.75 119.96 123.39 122.23 119.96 BTAR* 3.21 5.40 0.10 5.38 no yes SYM
4.1 10.15 7.24 5.67 10.37 10.02 5.67 BTAR* 5.57 7.17 3.83 5.95 no yes SYM
4.2 30.39 29.68 29.53 30.03 29.14 29.14 MTAR* 6.41 1.93 yes, asym yes MTAR*
8.1 -7.52 -9.21 -9.18 -7.52 -12.92 -12.92 MTAR* 3.70 5.36 no no STD
8.2 -16.10 -16.80 -19.22 -15.52 -18.30 -19.22 BTAR* 2.54 4.41 0.75 5.03 no yes SYM
Spain 2 -7.62 -12.34 -11.08 -1.04 -10.98 -12.34 TAR* 6.91 13.06 yes, asym yes TAR*
3 60.53 60.16 60.41 60.53 58.50 58.50 MTAR* 9.78 1.86 (yes, asym) yes MTAR*
4 11.07 10.06 6.64 11.44 10.59 6.64 BTAR* 4.86 4.89 0.66 6.20 no yes SYM
5 12.35 11.30 9.18 12.30 3.46 3.46 MTAR* 12.31 9.04 yes, asym yes MTAR*
6 -1.40 -4.38 -8.45 -0.69 -2.41 -8.45 BTAR* 3.79 5.53 0.26 9.88 no yes SYM
7 -86.66 -90.24 -89.73 -86.49 -88.86 -90.24 TAR* 3.91 4.14 no no STD
8 9.09 6.93 4.27 5.90 2.47 2.47 MTAR* 7.15 7.90 yes, asym yes MTAR*
10.1 -51.74 -52.86 -51.20 -54.09 -54.44 -54.44 MTAR* 22.82 5.99 yes, asym yes MTAR*
10.2 -74.05 -76.19 -75.69 -73.89 -82.03 -82.03 MTAR* 5.57 8.30 no no STD
Table A4: Pass-through of +1% shock in expected or unexpected monetary policy rate rate
country bankrate impact 1 mth 3 mths 6 mths 12 month longrun impact 1 mth 3 mths 6 mths 12 month longrun
Austria 2 0.30 0.28 0.55 0.73 0.62 0.61 0.18 0.16 0.45 0.71 0.64 0.61
3 0.36 0.38 0.56 0.67 0.66 0.61 0.36 0.39 0.56 0.67 0.66 0.61
4 0.36 0.50 0.72 0.75 0.60 0.63 0.24 0.40 0.65 0.74 0.61 0.63
7 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.02
8 0.21 0.29 0.44 0.47 0.43 0.44 0.16 0.26 0.42 0.47 0.43 0.44
Belgium 2 0.25 0.25 0.78 1.10 1.36 0.72 0.18 0.17 0.70 1.18 1.39 0.72
3 0.46 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.85 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.85
4.1 0.52 0.53 0.87 1.13 1.01 0.92 0.48 0.48 0.81 1.10 1.03 0.92
4.2 0.41 0.36 0.57 0.71 0.83 0.85 0.53 0.46 0.67 0.77 0.84 0.85
5 0.24 0.30 0.43 0.47 0.31 0.34 0.34 0.42 0.54 0.50 0.27 0.34
8 0.26 0.26 0.22 0.08 -0.42 0.83 0.52 0.59 0.64 0.65 0.57 0.83
9 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02
Finland 2 0.47 0.60 0.64 0.64 0.64 1.07 0.32 0.40 0.43 0.43 0.43 1.07
3 0.48 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.96 0.34 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.96
5 0.76 0.39 1.11 1.19 0.93 0.93 0.75 0.38 1.11 1.19 0.94 0.93
6 0.61 0.97 1.29 1.01 0.89 0.90 0.78 1.07 1.35 0.99 0.91 0.90
7 0.15 0.10 0.16 0.17 0.20 0.20 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.16 0.20
8 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 -0.10 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.04 -0.02 -0.10
10 0.11 0.11 0.20 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.05 0.05 0.16 0.36 0.36 0.36
France 4 0.55 0.30 1.22 1.13 0.68 0.79 0.37 0.20 1.21 1.09 0.65 0.79
5 0.26 0.36 0.54 0.67 0.72 0.72 0.14 0.27 0.46 0.63 0.72 0.72
8 0.93 0.93 1.16 1.10 0.94 0.98 0.76 0.76 0.98 1.08 0.95 0.98
9 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 -0.05 -0.14 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.05
Germany 2 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.47 0.18 0.27 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.47
3 0.12 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.38 0.16 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.38
4 0.24 0.31 0.42 0.48 0.50 0.63 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.63
5 0.18 0.29 0.51 0.73 0.53 0.50 0.13 0.20 0.45 0.70 0.57 0.50
8.1 0.51 0.63 0.60 0.62 0.64 0.73 0.42 0.51 0.46 0.49 0.54 0.73
8.2 0.46 0.69 0.84 0.84 0.82 0.82 0.45 0.69 0.84 0.84 0.82 0.82
9.1 0.12 0.15 0.19 0.14 0.05 0.27 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.11 -0.01 0.27
9.2 0.21 0.30 0.33 0.28 0.20 0.76 0.27 0.39 0.44 0.41 0.36 0.76
Ireland 1 0.43 0.48 0.52 0.64 0.77 0.78 0.32 0.36 0.41 0.47 0.59 0.78
2 0.51 0.59 0.68 0.72 0.65 0.63 0.64 0.75 0.80 0.79 0.64 0.63
4 0.43 0.46 0.48 0.52 0.66 0.70 0.34 0.37 0.38 0.41 0.44 0.70
5 0.43 0.41 0.48 0.56 0.63 0.66 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.66
6 1.07 0.99 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.08 0.99 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
9.1 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.22 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.22
9.2 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.28 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.28
Italy 2 0.14 0.41 0.60 0.55 0.60 0.60 0.20 0.44 0.61 0.56 0.60 0.60
4.1 0.28 0.32 0.49 0.64 0.63 0.62 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.59 0.66 0.62
4.2 0.29 0.42 0.53 0.74 0.84 0.81 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.54 0.87 0.81
5 0.59 0.36 1.16 0.98 0.71 0.72 0.52 0.31 1.16 0.99 0.70 0.72
7 0.21 0.29 0.27 0.33 0.40 0.42 0.05 0.07 -0.01 0.16 0.37 0.42
8 0.34 0.45 0.43 0.33 -0.03 0.64 0.21 0.27 0.19 -0.02 -0.79 0.64
10 0.19 0.26 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.35 0.04 0.06 0.04 -0.02 -0.18 0.35
Netherlands 2 0.15 0.23 0.31 0.41 0.52 0.56 0.17 0.26 0.34 0.44 0.53 0.56
4 0.82 0.47 0.75 0.89 0.95 0.98 0.72 0.42 0.68 0.83 0.92 0.98
7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.04
8.1 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 0.52 0.25 0.32 0.45 0.52 0.55 0.52
8.2 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.56 0.28 0.37 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.56
Portugal 2 0.36 0.37 0.54 0.62 0.65 0.83 0.16 0.17 0.27 0.36 0.43 0.83
3 -0.09 0.22 0.34 0.42 0.45 0.46 -0.34 0.20 0.31 0.40 0.45 0.46
4.1 0.14 0.20 0.36 0.44 0.39 0.38 0.13 0.19 0.35 0.44 0.39 0.38
4.2 0.47 0.32 0.72 0.74 0.62 0.63 0.35 0.23 0.68 0.76 0.61 0.63
8.1 0.39 0.47 0.49 0.49 0.49 1.01 0.41 0.50 0.52 0.52 0.52 1.01
8.2 0.13 0.23 0.37 0.51 0.53 0.51 0.09 0.20 0.35 0.50 0.53 0.51
Spain 2 0.19 0.32 0.44 0.45 0.34 0.84 0.03 0.06 0.04 -0.06 -0.36 0.84
3 0.45 0.20 0.83 0.73 0.64 0.63 0.56 0.25 0.87 0.73 0.64 0.63
4 0.63 0.87 1.05 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.78 0.91 1.07 0.86 0.86 0.85
5 0.53 0.20 0.89 0.84 0.71 0.72 0.19 0.07 0.80 0.86 0.70 0.72
6 0.43 0.60 0.91 1.02 0.80 0.81 0.36 0.54 0.86 1.01 0.81 0.81
7 0.21 0.23 0.32 0.36 0.37 0.63 0.15 0.16 0.22 0.25 0.26 0.63
8 0.54 0.52 0.58 0.65 0.72 0.76 0.30 0.30 0.41 0.56 0.69 0.76
10.1 0.65 0.63 0.88 1.09 1.00 1.00 0.65 0.62 0.88 1.09 1.00 1.00
10.2 0.23 0.32 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.79 0.24 0.34 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.79
multiplier associated with MPU shockmultiplier associated with MPE shock
